The article analyzes the strategic perspectives of Napoleon Bonaparte's Grand Army in the Campaign of 1812. There is also the Russian strategic perspective in 1812 in comparison with the French one. Objective factors influencing the situation of the armed forces of France and Russia are mainly considered. Authors focus on the distribution of human resources, as well as the losses suffered by Russia and France during the Napoleonic Wars until 1812. The authors prove that Napoleonic France suffered heavy losses during military campaigns in the period from 1800 to 1811, the French army had a particularly difficult situation on Iberian Peninsula, campaigns against Spain and Portugal were in many ways a continuation of the long-running so-called “Anglo-French duel”. The authors show in their work that the demographic situation in Russia was more favorable by 1812, which had a positive effect on its defense capability, which cannot be said about Napoleonic France, whose human reserves were not enough in 1812 for a war “on two fronts”. Russian Russian-Turkish (1806–1812) and Russian-Persian Wars (1804–51813) negatively affected Russia's ability to fight against Napoleonic France out of pulling large military contingents to southern borders. Authors also show that the structure of the Grand Army was not well thought out to carry out such operation as an offensive deep into European Russia. The authors rely mainly on English-language sources. © 2025 Elsevier B.V., All rights reserved.